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In a normative environment an agent’s actions are not only directed by its goals, but also by the norms activated by its actions
and those of other actors. The potential for conflict between agent goals and norms makes decision-making challenging, in that it
requires looking-ahead to consider the longer term consequences of which goal to satisfy or which norm to comply with in face of
conflict. We therefore seek to determine the actions an agent should select at each point in time taking account of its temporal goals,
norms and their conflicts. We propose a solution in which a normative planning problem is the basis for practical reasoning based on
argumentation. Various types of conflict within goals, within norms and between goals and norms are identified based on temporal
properties of these entities. The properties of the best plan(s) with respect to goal achievement and norm compliance are mapped to
arguments, followed by mapping their conflicts to attack between arguments, all of which are used to identify why a plan is justified.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In many environments, determining which actions to take – or practical reasoning – requires autonomous entities
(agents) not only to consider the goals they wish to achieve, but also to take norms into account. Norm is interpreted
in several ways in the literature: some interpretations capture general intentions about what is desirable or not (e.g.;
thou shalt not steal1), others indicate when a real-world action has institutional effect [Giannikis and Daskalopulu
2011; Li 2014] (e.g.; those passing the red light will be fined), while others capture precise descriptions of contextualized
behaviour [Kollingbaum 2005; Pacheco 2012] (e.g.; it is obligatory to pay the fine within two weeks of receiving it).
The key differentiator is that some norms offer general advice about what is (not) good, but not how to achieve it,
while others provide specific advice about how to act in the context of a more general (sometimes implicit) norm. The
latter category are referred to as the regulatory norm. In the work presented here, we use the pragmatic notion of norm,
∗Present Affiliation: Department of Computer Science and Technology, University of Cambridge, UK (CB3 0FD)
1This "norm" dates back to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 13th century.
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2 Shams, Z. et al
the regulatory norm, by advising an agent what it is obliged to do (i.e., obligation norm), or forbidden from doing (i.e.,
prohibition norm), either of which it may violate. Our focus is on action-based regulatory norms [Meneguzzi et al. 2015;
Oren et al. 2011], while state-based regulatory norms (i.e.; norms that oblige or forbid certain state of affairs) have also
been discussed in the literature [De Vos et al. 2013; Kollingbaum 2005].
Norm enforcement approaches (e.g., [Pitt et al. 2013; y López et al. 2005]) often associate punishment with norm
violation, so that avoiding punishment incentivises agents to comply with norms. However, agents might not wish or be
able to comply with all norms imposed on them, due either to norm conflicts2, or to their wishing to achieve a goal that
outweighs the cost of non-compliance. In such cases, the agent must identify which norm(s) it might violate, and accept
the punishment or lack of reward for so doing, or which goals it might not satisfy. In identifying actions, long-term
impacts must be considered. For instance, a goal satisfied at the cost of violating a norm might hinder or prevent more
important goals from being achievable. One way of reasoning about such long-term impacts of compliance and violation
requires the agent to consider the conflicts in the context of plans available to it. In so doing, an agent can take into
account the benefit of goal achievement and norm compliance against the cost of goal failure and norm violation in
different plans, and hence determine which plans are best to follow in presence of conflict.
Norms have been considered in both planning and plan selection in the past [Belchior et al. 2018; Broersen et al. 2002;
Kollingbaum 2005]. In order to generate conflict-free plans these works aim at resolving all normative conflicts. Since
norms cannot be violated, if conflict resolution is not possible, the planning fails. While generating conflict-free plans,
due to the possibility of violation, we allow more freedom in action selection, where an agent can take an action that
may cause a normative conflict. Alternative ways of resolving conflict then give rise to different plans. Our departure
point in doing this is [Shams et al. 2016], which analyses norm-goal and goal-goal conflicts statically, considering
whether they require different states of affairs to hold, but not the times at which the norms and goals are active. Here,
we extend that model by (i) considering temporal properties for goals, and (ii) proposing temporal solutions to goal-goal
and goal-norm conflicts as well as norm-norm conflicts.
Apart from the above distinction, earlier work mentioned [Belchior et al. 2018; Broersen et al. 2002; Kollingbaum
2005; Panagiotidi et al. 2012] focus on the reasoning processes of a fully autonomous system, without considering
the explainability of the system. In contrast, we consider domains where humans may need to understand why some
action or plan was selected for execution (such as human-agent teams, or where a developer is debugging agent
behaviour). This requires a transparent reasoning mechanism, rather than the numerical utilities of [Broersen et al.
2001; Kollingbaum and Norman 2003], that can serve as the basis for the justification of agent behaviour. We utilise
formal argumentation to derive such a reasoning process.
Argumentation serves as an effective computational tool for various agent activities including agent reasoning
[Amgoud 2003; Bench-Capon et al. 2009; Dung 1995; Gaertner and Toni 2007; Oren et al. 2007]. It supports the derivation
of consistent conclusions from conflicting, inconsistent and incomplete information as generic arguments (or argument
schemes [Walton 1996]). Such schemes also allow us to capture conflicts between arguments through the use of critical
questions, representing the context in which an argument is invalid. We can then use argumentation semantics [Dung
1995] to determine plan justifiability with respect to goal satisfaction and norm compliance/violation. In addition, we
describe how to discriminate between justified plans and identify a most preferred set of plans. Finally, we investigate
the formal properties of what our approach considers the best plan(s).
2This may well be due to the fact that norms come from different authorities aiming at regulating different aspects of agent behaviour.





















































Argumentation-based Reasoning about Plans, Maintenance Goals and Norms 3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide an illustrative scenario to
motivate our approach throughout the paper. In Section 3 we present the syntax and semantics of a model for normative
practical reasoning. Section 4 then explains the procedures to identify the best plan(s) using argumentation techniques.
The formulation of the illutrative scenario in Section 2, is provided in Section 5, along with examples for identifying the
best plan in this scenario. Related works are surveyed in Section 6, followed by conclusion in Section 7.
2 ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO: PART I
To illustrate our approach we extend the scenario in [Shams et al. 2017], such that like norms, goals have temporal
properties. Here a software agent acts as a supervisory system in a disaster recovery mission and supports human
decision-making. The agent plans on behalf of a group of human actors who are in charge of responding to an emergency
caused by an earthquake. It monitors the situation (e.g.; contamination of water, detection of aftershocks, etc.) to advise
humans of the different courses of action available, and help them decide which is best. We set the following goals:
(1) Running a hospital to help wounded people: fulfilled when, between timesteps3 5 and 8, medics are present to
offer help and they have access to water and medicines.
(2) Organising a survivors’ camp: fulfilled when the camp area is secured and a shelter is built by timestep 15.
We impose the following three norms that the agent must consider while devising plans to satisfy the above goals:
(1) It is forbidden to build a shelter within 3 time units of detecting shocks.
(2) It is obligatory to stop water distribution for 2 time units once contamination is detected in the water.
(3) It is forbidden to stop water distribution within 3 time units of building a shelter.
The full formulation of this scenario is provided in Section 5.
3 A MODEL FOR NORMATIVE PRACTICAL REASONING
We start from the model in [Shams et al. 2016] and [Shams et al. 2017], to build a richer model for practical reasoning.
In [Shams et al. 2016] a STRIPS [Fikes and Nilsson 1971] like action and planning language is the basis for normative
practical reasoning, allowing for (i) durative actions to reflect the time it takes to execute actions; (ii) a set of multiple
potentially inconsistent goals; and (iii) normative considerations in the practical reasoning process. The contribution
of this article is to extend the model in [Shams et al. 2017] to deal with goals that have temporal properties. As a
consequence, the contribution is also in formulating the conflict within goals, within norms and between the two with
respect to the newly defined temporal properties for goals. Such temporal goals [Hindriks et al. 2009] are discussed in
detail in agent programming languages such as GOAL [de Boer et al. 2007], however they are not commonly used in
practical reasoning frameworks due to the challenges they introduce to the agent’s decision making. The syntax and
semantics of the model are presented in the sections that follow.
3.1 Syntax and Semantics
A normative practical reasoning problem describes the domain over which reasoning takes place.
Definition 3.1 (Normative Practical Reasoning Problem). A normative practical reasoning problem is a tuple P =
(FL,∆,A,G,N ) where
3Time units may correspond to whatever is appropriate for the scenario, e.g., hours or days.





















































4 Shams, Z. et al
• FL is a set of fluents;
• ∆ is the initial state;
• A is a finite, non-empty set of durative actions;
• G is the agent’s set of goals;
• N is a set of norms imposed on the agent establishing what the agent is obliged or forbidden to do under certain
conditions.
3.1.1 Fluents and Initial State. FL is a set of domain fluents that accounts for the description of the domain the agent
operates in. A literal l is a fluent or its classical negation i.e., l = fl or l = ¬fl for some fl ∈ FL, with ¬¬f = f for
f ∈ FL. For a set of literals L, we define L+ = { fl ∈ FL| fl ∈ L} and L− = { fl ∈ FL|¬fl ∈ L} to denote the fluents in L
that are positive or negative, respectively. L is well-defined if L+ ∩ L− = ∅.
The semantics of the normative practical reasoning problem are defined over a set of states Σ. A state S ⊆ FL is
determined by the set of fluents that hold true at a given time, while the other fluents (those that are not present) are
considered to be false. A state S ∈ Σ satisfies fluent fl ∈ FL, denoted as S |= fl , if fl ∈ S . It satisfies its negation, denoted
as S |= ¬fl , if fl < S . This notation can be extended to a set of literals as follows: set X is satisfied in state S , denoted
S |= X , when ∀x ∈ X · S |= x .
The set of fluents that hold in the initial state is denoted as ∆ ⊆ FL.
We use an explicit representation of time, where time t + 1 is one unit ahead of t . Thus, a state St at a certain time t
refers to the set of fluents that hold at that time t .
3.1.2 Durative Actions. A is a set of durative actions, each of which has pre- and post-conditions. The effects of an
action (captured by its post-conditions) are not immediate, that is, it takes a non-zero period of time for the effects of an
action to take place, during which the action is said to be in progress. We also assume that actions are deterministic (i.e.,
execution of an action in a given state leads to one particular state) and take a fixed amount of time. We also assume
the preconditions of an action hold while the action is in progress.
Definition 3.2 (Durative Actions). A durative action a ∈ A is a tuple (pr, ps,d) where pr, ps ⊆ FL ∪ ¬FL such that
pr+ ∩ pr− = ps+ ∩ ps− = ∅ and d ∈ N+.
The sets pr ,ps are the possibly empty well-defined pre- and post-conditions of the action while d is the duration
of the action. For an action a = (pr, ps, d) we define the projections pr (a),ps(a) and d(a) to access the values pr, ps, d
respectively. Moreover, we use pr (a)+ and pr (a)− to refer to fluents that retrospectively should or should not hold in
the precondition pr (a); similarly, ps(a)+ and ps(a)− refer to the positive and negated fluents in ps(a). Also as mentioned
earlier we use an explicit and discrete representation of time. Thus if an action has a duration d and its starting point is
t , then its ending point will be t + d .
An action a can be executed in a state S if its preconditions hold in that state (i.e., S |= pr (a)). The postconditions of
a durative action cause changes to the state T in which the action ends. These changes consist of adding the positive
postconditions ps(a)+ to T and deleting the negative postconditions from ps(a)− from T . As a result, for a state T in
which action a ends, we have: T |= ps(a)+ and T ̸ |= ps(a)−.





















































Argumentation-based Reasoning about Plans, Maintenance Goals and Norms 5
3.1.3 Goals. Goals identify the state of affairs in the world that an agent wants to satisfy. Different types of goals and
their characteristics have been classified in the literature [van Riemsdijk et al. 2008]. Here, we consider maintenance
goals where a state has to be brought about first and then maintained over a certain period4.
Definition 3.3 (Goals). A goalд ∈ G is a tuple (requirement,maintenanceStart,maintenanceEnd), where requirement ⊆
FL ∪ ¬FL such that requirement+ ∩ requirement− = ∅ and maintenanceStart,maintenanceEnd ∈ N+ such that
maintenanceStart < maintenanceEnd.
The well-defined set of literals requirement represents the positive and negative goal requirements of the goal
while maintenanceStart and maintenanceEnd encode the start and end of the maintenance period. For a goal д =
(requirement,maintenanceStart,maintenanceEnd) we define the projections r (д),ms (д),me (д) to obtain the values
requirement,maintenanceStart,maintenanceEnd, respectively, from the tuple д. Intuitively, a goal is satisfied if Si |= r (д)
for all states Si with i betweenms andme .
3.1.4 Norms. As noted in the introduction, we model the notion of action-based regulatory norm to capture what an
agent ought (not) to do and what an agent is not permitted to do. The role of an obligation is to motivate the agent to
execute a specific action and the role of prohibition is to inhibit the agent from executing a particular action. Is it worth
noting that we are considering norms from the point of view of an agent - any norm the agent is aware of is assumed to
apply to it.
Definition 3.4 (Norms). A norm is a tuple of the form n = (op,ac ,as ,dl), where
• op ∈ {o, f } is the deontic operator determining the type of norm, which is an obligation or a prohibition;
• ac ∈ A is the durative action (cf. Def. 3.2) that activates the norm;
• as ∈ A is the durative action (cf. Def. 3.2) that is the subject of the obligation or prohibition;
• dl ∈ N is the norm deadline relative to the activation condition, which is the completion of the action ac .
An obligation expresses that executing action ac obliges the agent to start the execution of as within dl time steps
of the end of execution of ac . If this occurs, the obligation is complied with, otherwise, it is violated. A prohibition
expresses that executing action ac prohibits the agent to start the execution of as within dl time units of the end of
execution of ac . Such a prohibition is complied with if the agent does not start executing as before the deadline and is
violated otherwise. Note that since actions cannot be interrupted whilst in progress, the start of execution of as during
compliance period counts as compliance for obligations, the reverse applies to prohibitions.
A norm can be activated multiple times in a sequence of action, generating different instances of the original norm
[Alan S. Abrahams and Jean M. Bacon 2002]. Below we define instantiated norms in which instead of deadline, we have
the start and end of compliance period.
Definition 3.5 (Instantiated Norm). Given a norm n = (op,ac ,as ,dl) and the occurrence of action ac at time tac , we
define n’s instantiation as n = (op,ac ,as , comps , compe ) where comps and compe mark the start and end of compliance
period, respectively. The compliance period is calculated based on the start time tac of action ac and its duration (i.e.;
d(ac )), as follows: comps = tac + d(ac ), and compe = tac + d(ac ) + dl .
Having explained the syntax of the model, in the next section we turn our attention to the semantics.
4Note that requiring some condition always to be maintained, e.g., keeping the temperature above freezing, could be viewed as a maintenance goal from
time zero to infinity.





















































6 Shams, Z. et al
3.2 Plans and their Properties
Here we begin by defining a sequence of actions and what makes it a plan.
Definition 3.6 (Sequence of Actions). Suppose P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ) is a normative practical reasoning problem. π =
⟨(a0, 0), · · · , (an , tan )⟩ is a sequence of actions, where ai ∈ A, n ≥ 0, and tai ∈ N+. The action-time pair (ai , tai ) reads
as action ai is executed at time tai . We assume that π is temporally ordered, that is, ∀i < j · tai < taj .
The total duration of a sequence of actions, defined as Makespan(π ), is given by Equation 1.
Makespan(π ) =max(tai + d(ai ) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n) (1)
For a sequence of actions π , we denote the set of action-time pairs for which the actions end at time k as A(k), where
A(k) = {(a, t) ∈ π | k = t + d(a)}.
Sequences of actions start at specific state, which will then change depending on the actions executed: the postcondi-
tions of the executed actions cause changes to the state in which the actions end.
Definition 3.7 (Sequence of States). Let π = ⟨(a0, 0), · · · , (an , tan )⟩ be a sequence of actions for the normative practical
reasoning problem P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ). Execution of π from a state S0 results in a sequence of states S(π ) = ⟨S0, · · · Sm⟩,
withm = Makespan(π ), such that:





ps(a)−) ⋃ ( ⋃
(a,t )∈A(k )
ps(ai )+) A(k) , ∅
Sk−1 A(k) = ∅
(2)
Conflict caused by time, known as a concurrency conflict, prevents some actions from being executed in an overlapping
period of time. We define conflicting actions following [Blum and Furst 1997], as two actions that have pre- and
postconditions that contradict each other. This heuristic eliminates the possibility of two actions that are likely to
conflict due to their contradictory pre- and postconditions, to be executed concurrently. 5
Definition 3.8 (Conflicting Actions). The set of action pairs that have a concurrency conflict, denoted as cf action , is
defined as:
cf action = {(ai ,aj ) s .t . ai ,aj ∈ A |∃ r ∈ pr (ai ) ∪ ps(ai )+ · ¬r ∈ pr (aj ) ∪ ps(aj )− or
∃ ¬r ∈ pr (ai ) ∪ ps(ai )− · r ∈ pr (aj ) ∪ ps(aj )+}
(3)









. The pre and postconditions of this action













Therefore, these two actions cannot be executed concurrently. However, action secure effectively contributes to the
preconditions of buildShelter , which means they can be executed sequentially.
A sequence of actions satisfies a goal, if the goal requirements are satisfied for at least the duration of the maintenance
period of the goal.
Definition 3.10 (Goal Satisfaction). A sequence of actions π satisfies goal д, denoted π |= д, iff:
∀i ∈ [ms (д),me (д)] · si ∈ S(π ), si |= r (д). (4)
5Recall that in our formalism, it is assumed that the preconditions of an action are maintained until the action completes.





















































Argumentation-based Reasoning about Plans, Maintenance Goals and Norms 7
The set of goals satisfied by π is denoted as Gπ : Gπ = {д ∈ G | π |= д}.
A plan is a sequence of actions that fulfills the following criteria: (i) the sequence of actions starts in the initial
state; (ii) the preconditions of the actions are fulfilled at all states between the action commencing and completing6
(sequences of actions only deal with the post conditions); (iii) no action conflicts arise; and (iv) at least one goal is
satisfied. These conditions are formulated in the following definition.
Definition 3.11 (Plan). A sequence of actions π = ⟨(a0, 0), . . . , (an , tan )⟩ is a plan for the normative practical reasoning
problem P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ) iff:
(i) s0 = ∆,
(ii) ∀k ∈ [tai , tai + d(ai )) · sk |= pr (ai ),
(iii) ∄(ai , tai ), (aj , taj ) ∈ πtai ≤ taj < tai + d(ai ), (ai ,aj ) ∈ cf action , and
(iv) Gπ , ∅.
The set of plans for the agent is denoted as Π.
3.2.1 Normative Properties. Prior to defining norm compliance and violation, below we first define when a norm is
activated in a plan.
Definition 3.12 (Activated Norms). A norm n = (op,ac ,as ,dl) is instantiated and therefore activated in a plan π if its
activation condition ac is executed in the plan. The set of activated norms, denoted Nπ is defined as below. Note that
comps compe are calculated based on Definition 3.5.
Nπ = {(op,ac ,as , comps , compe ) | (op,ac ,as ,dl) ∈ N , (ac , tac ) ∈ π } (5)
Now that we know which norms are active, we can determine if they were complied with or violated.
Definition 3.13 (Obligation Compliance). Let π be a plan and also let n = (o,ac ,as , comps , compe ) be a norm activated
in the plan. We say that π complies with n iff the obliged actions starts during the compliance period:
π |= n iff (as , tas ) ∈ π s.t. tas ∈ [comps , compe ) (6)
If the action does not start before the compliance period ends the obligation is violated, denoted π ̸ |= n .
Definition 3.14 (Prohibition Compliance). Let π be a plan and also let n = (f ,ac ,as , comps , compe ) be a norm activated
in the plan. We say that π complies with n iff the prohibited action does not start during the compliance period:
π |= (n) iff ∀(as , tas ) ∈ π · tas < [comps , compe ) (7)
If the action does start during the compliance period the prohibition is violated, denoted π ̸ |= n .
For simplicity, if an active norm has not been violated or complied with during the makespan of the plan, it is
considered as violated. So all active norms in a plan are either complied with or violated. The set of norms complied
with and violated in plan π are denoted as Ncmp(π ) and Nvol (π ), respectively.
6The brackets and parenthesis used in the denotation of time intervals indicate the inclusion and exclusion of interval endpoints, respectively.





















































8 Shams, Z. et al
3.3 Conflict
In this section we define various types of conflicts within and between goals and norms. Note that since the conflicts
are looked at in the context of a plan, we are dealing with the instantiated version of the norms activated in plans.
Goal дi and дj are in conflict if their maintenance period overlaps and satisfying them requires bringing about
conflicting state of affairs.
Definition 3.15 (Conflicting Goals). Let P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ) be a the normative practical reasoning problem. The set
of conflicting goals, cf дoal , is defined as:
cf дoal = {(дi ,дj ) | ∃ дi ,дj ∈ G · (r (дi )+ ∩ r (дj )−) ∪ (r (дi )− ∩ r (дj )+) , ∅
and [ms (д1),me (д1)] ∩ [ms (д2),me (д2)] , ∅}






 , 5, 8








are in conflict because they require the agent to bring about contradictory state of affairs in an overlapping time period.
Next is conflict between goals and norms. An obligation and a goal can be in conflict with respect to a plan if the
norm is active during the maintenance period of the goal and the subject of the obligation has postconditions that are
contrary to the requirements of the goal. If the norm is to be complied with, as ’s execution should start within the
compliance period and end within the following period: [comps +d(as ), compe +d(as )) at which point the postcondition
is applied. If the latter period is the subset of maintenance period of goal д, there in no way for the agent to be able to
comply with the obligation while satisfying the goal.
Definition 3.17 (Conflicting Obligations and Goals). Let P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ) be a normative practical reasoning problem.
The set of conflicting goals and obligation norms with respect to a plan π , denoted cf πдoalobl , is defined as
cf πдoalobl ={(д, n) | n = (o,ac ,as , comps , compe ) ∈ Nπ ;
∃ r ∈ r (д) · ¬r ∈ ps(as ),
[comps + d(as ), compe + d(as )) ⊆ [msд ,meд ]}
Example 3.18. The postcondition of stopWater inn2 = (o, detectContamination, stopWater, 2), namely {¬waterSupplied},






 , 5, 8
ª®®®¬. Depending on the compliance
period of the instantiated version of this norm, runningHospital and n2 can be in conflict in the context of some plans.
We now turn our attention to conflicting prohibition and goals. If a prohibition norm is to be complied with, as ’s
execution should not start within compliance period, which makes it impossible for the end state of the action to
be within the following period: [comps + d(as ), compe + d(as )). When the postconditions of as contribute to the
requirements of goal д and that there is some overlap between the maintenance period of goal д, [msд ,meд ], and
[comps + d(as ), compe + d(as )), the agent cannot comply with the prohibition while satisfying the goal.





















































Argumentation-based Reasoning about Plans, Maintenance Goals and Norms 9
Definition 3.19 (Conflicting Prohibitions and Goals). Let P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ) be a normative practical reasoning
problem. The set of conflicting goals and prohibition norms with respect to a plan π , denoted cf πдoalpro , is defined as
cf πдoalpro ={(д, n) | n = (f ,ac ,as , comps , compe ) ∈ Nπ ;
∃ r ∈ r (д) · r ∈ ps(as ),
[comps + d(as ), compe + d(as )) ∩ [msд ,meд ] , ∅}







and n1 = (f , detectShock, buildShelter, 3)
can possibly be in conflict in the context of certain plans, because a postcondition of shelterBuilt, namely shelterBuilt,
contributes to the satisfaction of organiseSurvivorCamp, however the action is forbidden by the norm.
The entire set of conflicting goals and norms is defined as: cf πдoalnorm = cf
π
дoalobl ∪ cf πдoalpro . Next, we define
conflicts between norms.
Prior to defining conflict between norms, we note the distinction between direct and indirect conflict. In the former
category the conflict arises between norms with contrary deontic operators (e.g.; obligation and prohibition), whereas
in the latter the conflict is defined considering the characteristics of the domain the agent operate in [dos Santos et al.
2018]. When norms are action based, as it is the case here, the indirect conflict can occur due to consequences of actions
or their causal effects [Aphale et al. 2014; Vasconcelos et al. 2009]. The conflict between obligations (Definition 3.21),
that is essentially caused by the pre- and postconditions of actions, falls into the indirect conflict category. This can be
contrasted with conflict between obligations and prohibitions (Definition 3.23), which is a direct type of conflict.
Two obligations are in conflict in the context of π if their obliged actions have a concurrency conflict, and one obliged
action is in progress during the entire period over which the agent is obliged to execute the other obliged action.
Definition 3.21 (Conflicting Obligations). Let P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ) be a normative practical reasoning problem. The set
of conflicting obligations with respect to a plan π , denoted c f πoblobl is defined as:
c f πoblobl ={(n1, n2) | n1 = (o,ac ,as , comps , compe ), n2 = (o,bc ,bs , comp′s , comp′e ) ∈ Nπ ;
(as ,bs ) ∈ cf action ;
n1 ∈ Ncmp(π );
[comp′s , comp′e ) ⊆ [tas , tas + d(as ))}
Example 3.22. Take n2 = (o, detectContamination, stopWater, 2) and n4 = (o, buildShelter, distributeWater, 5). Due to








distributeWater = ⟨{}, {waterSupplied}, 1⟩ it is possible that in some plans they create conflict.
An obligation and a prohibition are in conflict in the context of π if the prohibition forbids the agent to execute an
action during the entire period over which the obligation obliges the agent to take the same action.
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Definition 3.23 (Conflicting Obligations and Prohibitions). Let P = (FL,∆,A,G,N ) be a normative practical reasoning
problem. The set of conflicting obligations and prohibitions with respect to a plan π , denoted c f πoblpro is defined as:
c f πoblobl ={(n1, n2) | n1 = (o,ac ,as , comps , compe ),
n2 = (f ,ac ,as , comp′s , comp′e ) ∈ Nπ ;
[comps , compe ) ⊆ [comp′s , comp′e )}
Example 3.24. n2 = (o, detectContamination, stopWater, 2) and n3 = (f , buildShelter, stopWater, 3) can be in conflict
in some plans as they require and forbid stopping water supply.
The two sets cf πoblobl and cf
π




oblobl ∪ cf πoblpro .
4 IDENTIFYING THE BEST PLAN
In the previous section we described a formal model for an agent that is capable of devising plans for achieving multiple
goals while complying with norms. However, conflicts often make it impossible for the agent to satisfy all goals while
complying with all the norms that a plan may trigger. The agent therefore needs to reason about all these conflicts
while taking its priorities, expressed in terms of preferences between goals and norms, into account to decide on the
best plan to execute. In this section, we consider how formal argumentation can enable an agent to select appropriate
plans to execute, taking all these factors into account.
Arguing over the appropriateness of a plan involves putting forward the plan as a proposal and letting the agent
question the justifiability of the plan proposal by investigating why a certain goal is not satisfied in the proposed
plan, or why a certain norm is violated. The evaluation of argumentation frameworks for the plan proposals results in
identifying justified plans. The justified plans are further refined in a search for the best plan, by comparing the quality
(i.e., preferences) and quantity (i.e., numbers) of goals satisfied and norms violated in these plans.
4.1 Plan Proposal Argumentation Frameworks
An argumentation framework (AF) is defined as below.
Definition 4.1. [Argumentation Framework [Dung 1995]] An argumentation framework is a pair AF = ⟨Arд,Att⟩,
where Arд is a finite set of arguments and Att is an attack relation between arguments: Att ⊆ Arд ×Arд.
Arguments represent defeasible logical inferences, while attacks show the inconsistency between arguments. In
scheme-based approaches arguments are expressed in natural language as defeasible rules. If the facts in the premise of
an argument scheme hold the argument scheme will be instantiated into an argument. A set of critical questions is
associated with each scheme, identifying how the instantiated arguments can be attacked.
Argumentation semantics [Dung 1995] are means of evaluating arguments in an AF. Caminada [Caminada 2006]
provides an intuitive way to identify the status of arguments with respect to various semantics through labellings: an
argument is labelled in, out and undec , if it is acceptable, rejected or undecided, respectively, under a certain semantics.
In a complete labelling an argument is labelled in iff all its attackers are labelled out , and is labelled out iff there exists
an attacker for it that is labelled in.
In deciding what semantics to use, the way conflicts are dealt with by different semantics is particularly important.
In what follows, we first explain how arguments, and the attacks between them, are identified when reasoning about a
plan proposal. We then justify why credulous preferred is the suitable semantics for evaluating plan proposal AFs.
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4.1.1 Generating Arguments. Below, we introduce a set of argument schemes and critical questions to reason about a
plan proposal with respect to the goals it satisfies and the norms it complies with or violates. Our schemes provide
arguments for why a plan should – or should not – be executed.
When instantiated, the most basic scheme we consider involves constructing an argument for each possible plan
that exists. This scheme is inspired by Oren’s scheme [Oren 2013] for a sequence of actions and Atkinson’s scheme for
plans in BDI agents [Atkinson 2005], and is referred to as a plan argument scheme.
Definition 4.2 (Plan Argument Scheme Arдπ ). A plan argument claims that a proposed sequence of actions should be
executed because it satisfies a set of goals and complies with a set of norms while violating some other norms:
- In the initial state ∆
- The agent should execute sequence of actions π
- Which will satisfy a set of goals Gπ and complies with a set of norms Ncmp(π ).
The next scheme results in constructing an argument for each goal that is feasible (i.e., satisfied in at least one
plan). If there is no plan to satisfy a goal, a rational agent should not adopt that goal or try to justify its adoption.
Goal arguments are therefore only constructed for feasible goals. A goal argument is used to explore why a goal is not
satisfied in a plan, or to address the conflict between two goals or a goal and a norm.
Definition 4.3 (Goal Argument Scheme Arдд ). A goal argument claims that a feasible goal should be satisfied:
- Goal д is feasible for the agent
- Therefore, satisfying д is required.
The set of goal arguments is denoted as ArдG .
Finally, we consider an argument scheme that creates arguments for each activated norm within a plan. Such norm
arguments are used to explore why a norm is violated in a plan. It is also used to address the conflict between two
norms or a goal and a norm.
Definition 4.4 (Norm Argument Scheme Arдn ). A norm argument claims that an activated norm should be complied
with:
- n is an activated norm imposed on the agent in plan π
- Therefore, complying with n is required in π .
The set of norm arguments for a plan π is denoted as ArдNπ .
4.1.2 Critical Questions and Interactions between Arguments. Arguments may challenge each other either by having
contradictory conclusions, or by expressing inconsistencies in another way. Such inconsistencies are captured through
critical questions, which attack the use of an argument by challenging or rejecting it based on the way it was instantiated
from an argument scheme. We now describe the critical questions associated with each argument scheme.
Critical Questions for the Plan Argument Scheme
CQ1: A plan should not be followed if it does not achieve a goal. This critical question, informally asking whether a
goal argument is not achieved by the plan, results in an asymmetric attack from the goal argument to the plan
argument. Formally, this occurs when the following condition holds.
∀Arдд ∈ ArдG if π ̸ |= д then (Arдд ,Arдπ ) ∈ Att
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CQ2: The violation of a norm by a plan provides a reason why the plan should not be followed, resulting in an attack
from the norm’s argument to the plan argument. This critical question asks whether a norm is violated by the
plan, and is formally encoded as follows.
∀Arдn ∈ ArдNπ if π ̸ |= n then (Arдn ,Arдπ ) ∈ Att
Critical Questions for the Goal Argument Scheme
CQ3: Mutually exclusive goals provide reasons why one or the other goal should not be pursued, resulting in a
symmetric attack between goal arguments. This critical question asks whether some other goal can be achieved if
this goal is not, leading to the following formal definition.
∀Arдд ,Arдд′ ∈ ArдG if (д,д′) ∈ cf дoal then (Arдд ,Arдд′) ∈ Att
CQ4: What norm arguments might attack Arдд? A conflicting goal and norm force an agent to choose between them
resulting in a symmetric attack between them. This critical question asks if there is some norm whose compliance
prevents the goal from being achieved.
∀Arдд ∈ ArдG ,Arдn ∈ ArдNπ if (д, n) ∈ cf πдoalnorm then (Arдд ,Arдn ) ∈ Att
Critical Questions for the Norm Argument Scheme
CQ4: This question is the dual of the previous one (CQ4 for goal argument schemes), stating that a norm might not be
complied with if it stands in the way of achieving a goal.
∀Arдд ∈ ArдG ,Arдn ∈ ArдNπ if (n,д) ∈ cf πдoalnorm then (Arдn ,Arдд) ∈ Att
CQ5: Two conflicting norms force an agent to choose between them. This can be informally specified as the critical
question of whether there is some other norm that is in conflict with this norm, and results in a symmetric attack
between the two norms, which is formally represented as follows.
∀Arдn ,Arдn′ ∈ ArдNπ if (n, n ′) ∈ c f πnorm then (Arдn ,Arдn′) ∈ Att
4.1.3 Preference Relation between Arguments. Generating arguments and applying the critical questions above results
in a set of arguments and attacks between them. However, an agent may prioritise certain goals and norms over others,
and these priorities can be reflected in the agent’s reasoning by encoding them as preferences. Such preferences allow
one to distinguish an attack from a defeat (i.e., a successful attack [Amgoud and Cayrol 2002]).
Definition 4.5 (Preference between Goals and Norms). We define ⪰дn as a partial preorder onG∪N , where α , β ∈ G∪N
denotes that satisfying goal α (or complying with norm α ) is at least as preferred as satisfying goal β (or complying with
norm β). Symbol ≻дn denotes the strict relation corresponding to ⪰дn : (α , β) ∈ ≻gn iff (α , β) ∈ ⪰дn and (β,α) < ⪰дn .
(α , β) ∈ ∼дn iff (α , β) ∈ ⪰дn and (β ,α) ∈ ⪰дn .
The preferences between the goal and norm arguments result from the preference between these goals and norms:
(Arдα ,Arдβ ) ∈ ⪰ iff (α , β) ∈ ⪰дn .
Each possible plan (a plan proposal) has an AF associated with it, consisting of the argument for the plan, a set of
arguments for goals, and arguments for norms that are activated in that plan. Although the set of goal arguments in
AFs for plan proposals remain the same across the AFs, the set of norm arguments differs between AFs depending on
the norms that are activated by the plan proposed within the AF.
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Definition 4.6 (Plan Proposal AF). The AF for plan proposal π is denoted as AFπ = ⟨Arg,Def ⟩, where Arg =
Argπ ∪ArgG ∪ArgNπ and ∀Argα ,Argβ ∈ Arg, (Argα ,Argβ ) ∈ Def iff (Argα ,Argβ ) ∈ AttCQ1−5 and (Argβ , Argα ) <≻.
We have described how a set of argument frameworks can be constructed from a set of norms, goals and plans. In
the next section, we describe how these argument frameworks can be evaluated.
4.2 Evaluating the Plan Proposal Argumentation Frameworks
As pointed out in Section 4.1 evaluating AFs is done using argumentation semantics [Dung 1995]. Credulous semantics
preserves choices and produces multiple alternatives in the case of unresolvable conflict between arguments, whereas
sceptical semantics rejects both arguments in an unresolvable conflict. Works [Broersen et al. 2002; Oren 2013; Prakken
2006; Thomason 2000] in the field of argumentation-based practical reasoning and decision-making are unanimous that
reasoning about and toward actions has to be credulous. If the conflict between goals for example is unresolvable then
what we want is to have choices between them rather than rejecting both of them. We refer the readers to [Caminada
2006] and [Prakken 2006] for the philosophical and pragmatic foundation of credulous inference for practical reasoning.
Taking membership of the preferred extension as a justified viewpoint that the agent can adopt, justified plans are
defined as those labelled in by a preferred labelling of their associated AF (i.e.; if π is labelled in in AFπ ). In such a
situation, one can conclude that the plan is justifiable with respect to the agent’s set of goals and set of norms activated
in that plan, along with conflicts and preferences between the set of goals and norms.
Definition 4.7 (Preferred Labellings). A complete labelling is called a preferred labelling, iff its set of in-labelled
arguments is maximal (with respect to set inclusion), or equivalently, iff its set of out-labelled arguments is maximal
(with respect to set inclusion).
Definition 4.8 (Justified Plans). Plan π is justified if Arдπ is labelled in by at least one preferred labelling for AFπ :
∃ Lpr s.t. Arдπ ∈ in(L).
Although all the justified plans are internally coherent and defendable by the agent, there could be further criteria
that allows one to decide that some plan is more preferred, or better, than some other plan. Identifying an ordering
between justified plans has been treated differently. Some works (e.g., [Amgoud et al. 2008b]) do not distinguish between
justified plans and regard them as “as good as” each other. Therefore, all the justified plans are the best plans. Simply
maximising the number of achieved desires is the basis of comparison of justified options in [Hulstijn and van der Torre
2004], while [Rahwan and Amgoud 2006] uses the utility of plans (i.e., the worth of desires and the cost of resources
to achieve them) to find the best plan out of the justified ones. In this work, what is available to the agent is a partial
preference order over goals and norms. We therefore, use the established set ordering technique [Amgoud and Vesic
2014; Caminada et al. 2014b; Prakken and Sartor 1997] known as the democratic ordering for further refinement of
justified plans by considering the combination of goals satisfied and norms violated in these plans. Since preferences over
goals and norms are partial, comparing two plans based on the democratic ordering is not always possible. Therefore,
in the absence of such preference information, the best plan is defined as the one that satisfies the most goals while
violating fewest norms. We first give a formal account of the democratic ordering and then define the goal-dominant
and norm-dominant plans, based on which a better than relation between plans is defined.
Definition 4.9 (Democratic Ordering). Let Si and Sj be two sets of objects. According to the democratic ordering
(denoted ⊵) (Si , Sj ) ∈ ⊵ iff ∀β ∈ Sj \ Si ,∃α ∈ Si \ Sj s.t. (α , β) ∈ ≻. As usual (Si , Sj ) ∈ ▷ iff (Si , Sj ) ∈ ⊵ and (Si , Sj ) < ⊵.
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The democratic ordering is reflexive and transitive.7
Definition 4.10 (Goal Dominance: Democratic Ordering). Let Gπi and Gπj be the sets of goals satisfied in plan πi and
πj . According to the democratic ordering (Gπi ,Gπj ) ∈ ⊵G iff ∀д′ ∈ Gπj \Gπi ,∃д ∈ Gπi \Gπj s.t. (д,д′) ∈ ≻дn .
Let ≻д be the ordering on G induced by ≻дn .
Theorem 4.11. ⊵G is a total preorder on P(G) iff ≻д is a total preorder.8
See Appendix B for the proof of this theorem and the rest of propositions and properties in this Section.
Given theorem 4.11, we must identify when ⊵G ( Definition 4.10) is a total preorder overGΠ = {Gπ1 ,Gπ2 , · · · ,Gπn },
where Gπi is the set of goals satisfied by plan πi .
Corollary 4.12. ⊵G is a total preorder on GΠ if ≻д is total.
The above corollary follows immediately from Theorem 4.11 because GΠ ⊆ P(G). However, note that having a total
preorder on ⊵G , does not necessarily mean we need to have a total order on G. Here is a counter example.
Example 4.13. Let G = {д1,д2,д3} and ≻д= {(д2,д3)}. Also let GΠ = {Gπ1 ,Gπ2 }, where Gπ1 = {д1,д2} and Gπ2 =
{д1,д3}. It is clear that (Gπ1 ,Gπ2 ) ∈ ⊵G . Therefore, we have a total preorder on GΠ while ≻д is not a total order on G.
We are now in a position to define goal-dominance. Plan πi goal-dominates plan πj in two ways. First, if for every
goal satisfied in πj which is not satisfied in πi , there is at least one preferred goal satisfied in πi which is not satisfied
in πj . Second, if there is insufficient preference information available, one plan goal-dominates another if the former
satisfies more goals than the latter.
Definition 4.14 (Goal-dominance). Plan πi goal-dominates πj , denoted as (πi ,πj ) ∈ ≥G
(1) If ⊵G is a total preorder on GΠ and (Gπi ,Gπj ) ∈ ⊵G ;
(2) If ⊵G is not a total preorder on GΠ and |Gπi | ≥ |Gπj |.
>G is the strict relation associated with ≥G . (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼G iff (πj ,πi ) ∈ ≥G and (πi ,πj ) ∈ ≥G .
It is straight forward to see >G is irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, while ∼G is reflexive, symmetric and
transitive.
Note that – as done by [Amgoud and Prade 2009] – goal-dominance could equivalently be defined in argument level
(i.e.; in terms of preferences over justified goal arguments, and the number of justified goal arguments appearing within
the plan (c.f., Properties 4 and 5 on page 16)).
Similar to Definition 4.14, norm dominance is defined based on the democratic ordering and number of violations.
Plan πi norm-dominates plan πj if for every norm violated in πi that is not violated in πj , there is at least one stronger
norm violated in πj that is not violated in πi .
Definition 4.15 (Norm Dominance: Democratic Ordering). Let Nvol (πi ) and Nvol (πj ) be the sets of norms violated
in plan πi and πj . According to the democratic ordering (Nvol (πi ),Nvol (πj )) ∈ ⊵N iff ∀n ∈ Nvol (πi ) \ Nvol (πj ),∃n′ ∈
Nvol (πj ) \ Nvol (πi ) s.t. (n′,n) ∈ ≻дn .
Let Nvol (Π) = {Nvol (π1),Nvol (π2), · · · ,Nvol (πn )}, where as before Nvol (πi ) is the set of norms violated in plan i .
7See [Amgoud and Vesic 2014] for proof.
8P (G) is the power set of G .
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Definition 4.16 (Norm-dominance). Plan πi norm-dominates πj denoted as (πi ,πj ) ∈ ≥N
(1) If ⊵N is a total preorder on Nvol (Π) and (Nvol (πi ),Nvol (πj )) ∈ ⊵N ;
(2) If ⊵N is not a total preorder on Nvol (Π) and |Nvol (πj ) | ≥ |Nvol (πi ) |.
>N is the strict relation associated with ≥N . (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼N iff (πj ,πi ) ∈ ≥N and (πi ,πj ) ∈ ≥N .
It is straight forward to see that >N is irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, while ∼N is reflexive, symmetric
and transitive.
Goal dominance and norm dominance can be defined and combined in various ways to provide the basis for plan
comparison. For examples, a norm-dominant plan can be defined as a plan with the highest return on norm compliance,
rather than minimum violation, or in combining these factors norm dominance can be given priority over norm
dominance. The general idea, however will be the same: we favour plans that are goal-dominant and norm-dominant.
In what follows, we give priority to dominance of goals over norms. The dominance of norms can be given priority
over the dominance of goals by swapping the order of conditions 2 and 3 in the following definition.
Definition 4.17 (Plan Comparison). Plan πi is better than πj , denoted (πi ,πj ) ∈ >π , iff:
(1) πi is justified and πj is not; or
(2) πi and πj are both justified and (πi ,πj ) ∈ >G ; or
(3) πi and πj are both justified and (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼G but (πi ,πj ) ∈ >N .
Plan πi is as good as πj , denoted (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼π , iff (πi ,πj ) < >π and (πj ,πi ) < >π .
Proposition 4.18. >π is irreflexive.
Proposition 4.19. >π is antisymmetric.
Proposition 4.20. >π is transitive.
Proposition 4.21. ∼π is an equivalence relation on Π.
Definition 4.22 (Plan Equivalence Classes). Given π ∈ Π, let [πi ] denote the equivalence class to which πi belongs.
([πi ], [πj ]) ∈ ≥ iff (πi ,πj ) ∈ >π or (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼π .
Proposition 4.23. ≥ is a total order on Π.
Definition 4.24 (Best Plan). Plan πi is the best plan for the agent to execute iff
• πi is justified, and
• ∄πj such that ([πj ], [πi ]) ∈ ≥.
Based on this definition, there might be more than one plan identified as a best plan. In the case of a single agent, any
of these plans can be chosen at random.9 For argumentation-based plan construction and plan selection in a multi-agent
setting, see [Ferrando and Onaindia 2017] and [Belesiotis et al. 2010], respectively. In these work, agents participate in
iterated dialogues by exchanging arguments about different plan proposals, until they reach an agreement.
Prior to give a comprehensive example (Section 5) on constructing plan proposal AF, evaluating them and identifying
the best plan based on them, we investigate the formal properties of our framework in the next section.
9Additional refinement criteria, such as selecting the shortest plan, could be introduced to filter the best plan set further.
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4.3 Properties of the Framework
We now consider the properties of our framework with regards to rationality postulates [Caminada and Amgoud 2007],
which identify desired properties of argumentation systems (see Properties 1 to 3). Compliance with rationality postulates
demonstrates that our argumentation system satisfies the fundamental properties required of an argumentation system.
We also investigate the properties of the best plan(s) and the preferred extensions that include it (see Properties 4 to
7). In addition, we show the satisfiability of the Maximal Elements Postulate [Amgoud and Vesic 2014] (see property
8). The intuition behind proving this property is to show that our framework privileges the maximal elements (i.e.,
strongest arguments). That is, the strongest arguments in an AF, when conflict-free, are all labelled in by the preferred
labelling that labels the plan argument in. The last property (Property 9) is inspired by Brewka and Eiters’ Principle
I [Brewka and Eiter 2000], which is a principle for sound extension-based reasoning with preferences. Basically, the
principle expresses that if two extensions only differ in one argument, depending on the preference between the distinct
argument in each, the viewpoint presented by one can be given priority over the other.
Property 1. Rationality Postulate, Closure: The conclusions of any extension (in labelled arguments) are closed under
strict rules.
Property 2. Rationality Postulate, Direct Consistency: The conclusions of any extension are consistent.
Property 3. Rationality Postulate, Indirect Consistency: The closure under strict rules of the conclusions of any extension
is consistent.
Property 4. If a plan argument is labelled in by preferred labelling L, the arguments representing all the goals that it
does not satisfy and the norms it violates are labelled out by L and vice versa:





n ∈Nvol (π )
Arдn ⊆ out(L)
Property 5. If a plan argument is labelled in by preferred labelling L, the arguments representing all the goals that it
satisfies and norms it complies with are also labelled in by L:











n ∈Ncmp(π ) Arдn ⊆ in(L) one cannot conclude that Arдπ ∈ in(L), as there might
be justified goals or norms not satisfied or complied with by the plan.
Property 6. There is no more than one preferred labelling in which Arдπ ∈ in(L).
Property 7. If Arдπ ∈ in(L) then L is a stable labelling.
Property 8. Let ⪰дn be a total preorder on G ∪ N and therefore ⪰ be a total preorder on goal and norm arguments.
If Arдπ ∈ in(L), and the set of arguments for the most preferred goals and norms, Pref (Arд), is conflict free then all
arguments belong to Pref (Arд) are labelled in by L.
Property 9. Assume that plan π1 and π2 are both justified (i.e., Arдπ1 ∈ in(LAFπ1 ) and Arдπ2 ∈ in(LAFπ2 )). Let the
preferred extensions that contain Arдπ1 and Arдπ2 be E1 and E2, respectively such that (i) E1 \ {Arдπ1 } = E0 ∪ {Arдα }
and E2 \ {Arдπ2 } = E0 ∪ {Arдβ }; (ii) Arдα ,Arдβ < E0; and (iii) (Arдα ,Arдβ ) ∈ ≻ . It holds that plan π1 is always better
than plan π2 (i.e., (π1,π2) ∈>π ) except when Arдα is a norm argument and Arдβ is a goal argument.
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5 ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO: PART II
To illustrate our approach we proposed a scenario in Section 2. The full formulation of this scenario is as follows. Let

















buildShelter, evacuate, getMedicine, secure
}
where
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• N = {n1,n2,n3}, where: n1 = (f , detectShock, buildShelter, 3), n2 = (o, detectContamination, stopWater, 2), and
n3 = (f , buildShelter, stopWater, 3).
Since the requirements of the two goals are not inconsistent, the set of potential goal-goal conflict is empty: cf дoal = ∅.
The requirements of runningHospital is in conflict with the postconditions of stopWater that is the subject of obligation
n2, because the former requireswaterSupplied, while the latter brings about¬waterSupplied. Goal organiseSurvivorCamp
does not conflict with n2, thus the set of potential goal obligation conflict is: cf πдoalobl = {(runningHospital,n2)}. Next
is the conflicts between goals and prohibitions. organiseSurvivorsCamp can conflict with n1, becasue the goal requires
shelterBuild, but n1 forbids action buildShelter , the postcondition for which is shelterBuild. runningHospital and n3 can
potentially be in conflict in the same fashion. Therefore, the set of potential conflict between goals and prohibitions is:
cf πдoalpro = {(organiseSurvivorsCamp,n1), (runningHospital,n3)}. Since there is a single obligation the set cf πoblobl is
empty. Last is the conflict between obligation and prohibition. Since n2 obliges the agent to take action stopWater , while
n3 forbids this action, they can potentially conflict: cf πoblpro = {(n2,n3)}. In what follows we show plans in which due
to different sequencing of actions, some of these potential conflicts have occurred, and some others have not.
This planning problem is implemented using Answer Set Programming (ASP) [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988], which
is a declarative programming paradigm using logic programs under Answer Set semantics. In this paradigm the user
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provides a description of a problem and ASP works out how to solve the problem by returning answer sets corresponding
to problem solutions. Since implementation is not the focus of current article, we refer the readers to [Shams et al. 2017]
for details of mapping the planning problem to ASP and getting the plans in terms of answer sets.
After generating the plans, the agent has to decide on the best one to follow using argumentation. Let us now
consider some plans for this scenario to show how the agent construct their associated AF to check the justifiability of
the plans. Note that, in order to make studying plans easier in terms of (i) their sequence of actions, (ii) the fluents that
hold in each state, (iii) goal satisfaction and norm compliance/violation, we visualise their associated answer sets in
Appendix A.
Example 5.1. Let π1,π2,π3,π4 ∈ Π be four plans for the agent as follows:
π1 = {(getMedicine, 0), (detectShock, 1), (evacuate, 2), (secure, 7),
(buildShelter, 12), (detectContamination, 14), (stopWater, 15)}
π2 = {(getMedicine, 0), (detectShock, 2), (evacuate, 3), (detectContamination, 5),
(secure, 8), (buildShelter, 13), (stopWater, 15)}
π3 = {(detectShock, 0), (evacuate, 1), (secure, 6), (detectContamination, 7),
(stopWater, 8), (buildShelter, 11), (getMedicine, 13)}
π4 = {(detectShock, 0), (evacuate, 1), (secure, 6), (detectContamination, 9),
(buildShelter, 11), (getMedicine, 12), (stopWater, 15)}
Plan π1 and π2 satisfy both goals runningHospital and organiseSurvivorsCamp, while π3 and π4 only satisfy goal
organiseSurvivorsCamp. Since actions detectShock, detectContamination, and buildShelter , that are the activation condi-
tion of norms n1, n2, and n3, respectively, are executed in all four plans, the set of activated norms in all plans includes
an instantiated version of these norms10. The set of instantiated norms complied with or violated varies across plans as
stated below.
• π1 |= {runningHospital, organiseSurvivorsCamp},
Nπ1 = {n11, n21, n31}, Ncmp(π1) = {n11, n21}, Nvol (π1) = {n31}
• π2 |= {runningHospital, organiseSurvivorsCamp},
Nπ2 = {n12, n22, n32}, Ncmp(π2) = {n12}, Nvol (π2) = {n22, n32}
• π3 |= {organiseSurvivorsCamp},
Nπ3 = {n13, n23, n33}, Ncmp(π3) = {n13, n23, n33}, Nvol (π3) = {}
• π4 |= {organiseSurvivorsCamp},
Nπ4 = {n14, n24, n34}, Ncmp(π4) = {n14}, Nvol (π4) = {n24, n34}
Figures 1-4 show11 the AF associated with each of these plans in absence of any preference information. Arrows,
representing attacks, are annotated with the CQ that causes the attack. Essentially, the attacks are characterising the
10nxy is the instantiated version of norm x in plan y . For example, n32 refers to the instantiated version of norm n3 in π2 , while n′32 could be another
instantiation of the same norm in the same plan.
11run and org stand for runningHospital and organiseSurvivorsCamp. Also Pr. ex. is abbreviation for Preferred Extension.






























































Fig. 1. AF Associated with Plan π1
Pr. Ex. 1 ={Arдπ1 , Arдrun , Arдorд , Arдn11 , Arдn21 }











Fig. 2. AF Associated with Plan π2
Pr. Ex. 1 ={Arдπ2 , Arдorд , Arдrun , Arдn12 }









Fig. 3. AF Associated with Plan π3
Pr. Ex. 1 ={Arдπ3 , Arдrun , Arдorд , Arдn13 }











Fig. 4. AF Associated with Plan π4
Pr. Ex. 1 ={Arдrun , Arдorд , Arдn14 , Arдn24 }
Pr. Ex. 2 ={Arдorд , Arдn14 , Arдn24 , Arдn34 }
conflict that is detected in the plan (i.e.; conflict detection phase). The conflicts are resolved by applying preferred
semantics that give rise to extensions listed below each figure (i.e.; conflict resolution phase). For example, if a conflict
between argument for norm A and norm B is detected, there will be two preferred extensions, one of which resolves
the conflict by recommending complying with norm A and violating B, while the other extension favours complying
with B and violating A.
In Figure 1, Arдπ1 represents the plan argument that is under consideration in this framework. Since both goals
runningHospital and organiseSurvivorsCamp are satisfied in this plan, argumentsArдrun andArдorд do not attackArдπ .
On the hand, since norm n31 is violated in this plan, Arдn31 attacks Arдπ , which provides a way to enquire why the plan
has violated this norm. The other two norms are complied with in this plan, Arдn11 and Arдn21 , thus do not attack Arдπ .
The attack between Arдrun and Arдn31 is due to their conflict and it provides a way to enquire why n31 was violated in
favour of satisfying goal runningHospital. Here, there are no more conflicts between goals and norms, and hence no
more attacks in the AF. AFs for plans π2–π4, are constructed in the same manner. Notice that depending on the actions
executed in each plan and their sequence, some arguments attack each other only in some AFs. For example Arдn2 and
Arдrun attack each other in π2 and π3, but not in π1 and π4.
Example 5.2. Consider plans π1 to π4 from previous example and assume there are no preferences available to the
agent. The first condition of the best plan is justifiability with respect to preferred semantics. Looking into the preferred
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extensions of each framework in Figures 1 to 4, we can see that apart from π4, the plan arguments for the other three
plans is acceptable under preferred semantics (the plan argument appears in at least one extension, which is equivalent
to being labelled in by at least one preferred labelling), which means these plans are justified and according to Definition
4.17, they are better than π4: (π1,π4), (π2,π4), (π3,π4) ∈>π . Both plans π1 and π2 goal-dominate plan π3, because they
satisfy one goal more than π3, so we have: (π1,π3), (π2,π3) ∈>G . Plan π1 and π2 satisfy the same set of goals, thus:
(π1,π2) ∈∼G . However, the number of norms violated in π2 is greater than in π1. Therefore, π1 norm-dominates π2:
(π1,π2) ∈>N . Based on the third condition of Definition 4.17, (π1,π2) ∈>π . Since π1 is justified and there is no plan
better than π1, ∄π s.t. (π ,π1) ∈≥, it is the best plan.
Consider the same plans again but now assume the agent prefers complying with n3 rather than satisfying
runninдHospital : (n3, runninдHospital) ⪰дn . Here the effect of preferences on the justifiability of plans is remarkable:
in addition to π4, π1 and π2 are not justified and therefore, plan π3 is the only justified plan and thus the best plan.
The above example shows how the agent can decide on the justifiability of the plans and use its preferences to
resolve the conflict and identify the best course of action to follow.
6 RELATEDWORK AND DISCUSSION
Several work consider norms and their conflict in planning and plan selection. [dos Santos et al. 2018] provides a
comprehensive survey of normative conflict detection and resolution, including works that look at this problem in the
context of planning which are reviewed below.
The BOID (Belief-Obligation-Intention-Desire) architecture [Broersen et al. 2002] extends the BDI architecture [Rao
and Georgeff 1995] with the concept of obligation and uses agent types such as social, selfish, etc. to handle the conflicts
between beliefs, desires, intentions and obligations. For instance if the agent is selfish, it will always considers its
desires prior to any obligation. In contrast, a social agent always puts obligations prior to its desires. This architecture
is considered as a model for norm-governed agent, although it lacks a computational model for implementation.
NoA, proposed by [Kollingbaum 2005], is a normative language and agent architecture. As a language, it specifies
the normative concepts of obligation, prohibition and permission to regulate a specific type of agents interaction
called “supervised interaction”. As a practical reasoning agent architecture, it describes how agents select a plan from a
pre-generated plan library such that the norms imposed on the agent at each point of time are obeyed. The agents
do not have internal motivations such as goals or values that might conflict with norms, which therefore, enables the
agent always to comply with norms.
[Belchior et al. 2018] propose a planning algorithm that in each step of planning checks whether the action added to
the current plan would cause any normative conflict. If so, the action will be removed from the set of available actions
to the agent. Thus, the plans generated are guaranteed to be conflict-free. That said, if all the actions available to the
agent create normative conflict, the planning algorithm does not suggest any plans.
In order to generate conflict-free plans [Belchior et al. 2018; Broersen et al. 2002; Kollingbaum 2005] aim at resolving
all conflicts. While generating conflict-free plans, due to the possibility of violation, we allow more freedom in action
selection, where an agent can take an action that may cause a normative conflict. Alternative ways of resolving the
conflict (violating one of the norms in conflict or another, or both) generate different plans that will then be subjected
to comparison in terms of their goal satisfaction and normative quality. In addition, the focus of these approaches is on
answering how an agent should act in a normative environment while it has conflicting goals and norms regardless
of the transparency of the reasoning taken to answer that question. In contrast,we consider domains where humans
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may need to understand why some action or plan was selected for execution. This requires a transparent reasoning
mechanism, rather than the numerical utilities, that can serve as the basis for the justification of agent behaviour. We
utilise formal argumentation to derive such a reasoning process. Thus the rest of this section is dedicated to surveying
argumentation-based approaches to planning and practical reasoning.
Current work on argumentation-based practical reasoning can be divided into two categories, namely logic-based (e.g.,
[Amgoud 2003; Amgoud et al. 2008b; Hulstijn and van der Torre 2004; Rahwan and Amgoud 2006]) and scheme-based
(e.g., [Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007; Oren 2013]). In the former category, some argumentation semantics applied to
an argumentation framework are used to generate a subset of consistent desires and plans to achieve them, which are in
some sense optimised. The second category, into which this paper falls, utilizes defeasible inference rules (i.e., argument
schemes and critical questions) to identify and justify some set of “best” plans. This latter category of approaches seeks
to identify what plans can be constructed, ensuring consistency, correctness, and some form of optimality (e.g., maximal
goal achievement), while specifying the order in which plan actions should be executed.
In the logic-based category, [Rahwan and Amgoud 2006] offers an instantiation of Dung’s AF for generating consistent
desires and plans for BDI agents [Rao and Georgeff 1995]. The authors consider three different Dung style AFs for
arguing about beliefs and their truth value, about desires and justification of their adoption and about intentions.
Arguing about intention, i.e., what is the best course of actions to achieve desires, is based on the utility of desires
and resources required to achieve them. Continuing the work of [Rahwan and Amgoud 2006], [Amgoud et al. 2008b]
proposes a constrained argumentation system that takes arguing about desires further by excluding the possibility of
adopting desires that are not feasible. However, [Amgoud et al. 2008b] does not include any mechanism to compare
various sets of justified and feasible desires. Unlike [Amgoud 2003; Rahwan and Amgoud 2006], [Hulstijn and van
der Torre 2004] does not use multiple AFs to capture the conflicts between beliefs, desires/goals and intentions/plans.
Instead, they extract goals by reasoning forward from desires, followed by deriving plans for goals, using planning rules.
Goals that have a plan associated with them, can be modelled as an argument consisting of a claim and its necessary
support. These arguments form an AF for planning, in which there is an attack between conflicting plans. They then
look for an extension of this AF that maximises the number of achieved desires as opposed to considering the quality or
utility of these desires that is the base of comparison in [Rahwan and Amgoud 2006].
Scheduling actions is not a focus of the logic-based approaches reviewed above. Instead, they concentrate on
identifying a subset of consistent desires and the plans to achieve them. These approaches do not detail when and
in which order agents should execute the selected plans. In contrast, recent developments in argumentation-based
deliberative dialogues directly concern themselves with planning (e.g., [Belesiotis et al. 2010; Ferrando and Onaindia
2017]). However, they mainly focus on multi-agent plan construction and selection towards the achievement of a
common goal when agents have different beliefs. Thus, dealing with conflicting goals does not figure in these approaches.
In the scheme-based category, most approaches to practical reasoning build on [Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007],
which uses Action-based Alternating Transition System (AATS) [Wooldridge and van der Hoek 2005], based on the
agent’s knowledge of actions with pre- and postconditions, and the values they promote. Using AATS along with a
set of argument schemes and critical questions, arguments are generated for each available action. These arguments
are then organised into a Value-based Argumentation Framework (VAF) [Bench-Capon 2003], where the preference
between arguments is defined according to the values the actions promote and the goals they contribute to.
The approach proposed by [Oren 2013] is also based on AATS and an argumentation scheme, and adopts some
ideas from [Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007], however, unlike [Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007], it permits practical
reasoning in the presence of norms. As a result, preferences between arguments are defined by considering all possible
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[Hulstijn and van der Torre 2004] BDI DAF N/A Achievement Goal-Goal,Plan-Plan
[Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007],
[Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2016],
[Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2014]
AATS VAF Value AchievementMaintenance value-value

















Table 1. Argumentation-based Frameworks for Practical Reasoning
interactions between norms and goals instead of values and goals [Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007]. For an extensive
discussion about the relation between norms and values, we refer the readers to [Bench-Capon 2016]. While [Oren
2013] provides a set of schemes for normative practical reasoning, the soundness and correctness of that approach was
left for future work.
Similar to [Oren 2013], [Shams et al. 2016] constructs arguments for plans rather than actions. [Oren 2013] assumes
that conflicts within and between goals and norms are inferred from sequences of states which come about due to
action execution, and are thus left implicit, rather than being formally defined as is the case in [Shams et al. 2016] and
here (see Section 3.3). Thus, although it is possible to explain why one path is preferred over another, it is not possible
to explicitly link goal satisfaction with norm violation, unless all paths where the goal is satisfied are considered. In
contrast, [Shams et al. 2016] explicitly considers why an agent does not satisfy a goal, or violate a norm, by appealing
to the underlying conflict between them, rather than looking at all plans and inferring that, for example, if two goals
are not simultaneously satisfied in any plan, then they are in conflict.
The work of [Toniolo et al. 2012] also considers norms in collaborative planning, but unlike our work and [Oren
2013], the norms are regimented, forcing the agent always to comply with norms, and ignoring the possibility of
violation. Permitting violations of norms allows an agent to ignore a norm in order to pursue a more important goal,
to deal with normative conflict, or to allow it to act in an unexpected situation. Furthermore, allowing violation is
important in open multi-agent systems, where the unknown nature of agents participating in the system means that no
guarantees regarding norm compliance can be provided.
Above we contrasted [Shams et al. 2016] with other scheme-based approaches [Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007;
Oren 2013; Toniolo et al. 2012]. Here the extensions that the current work is made to [Shams et al. 2016] are reviewed.
First, this work considers maintenance rather than achievement goals [Hindriks and van Riemsdijk 2007] used in [Shams
et al. 2016]. Since goals did not have temporal properties in [Shams et al. 2016], addressing goal-goal and goal-norm
12ExAF stands for Extended Argumentation Framework [Modgil 2007].
13SC stands for Situation Calculus [Reiter 1991].
14BAF stands for Bipolar Argumentation Framework [Amgoud et al. 2008a].
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conflicts temporally was not an option. Thus, the second and more important extension that this work makes to [Shams
et al. 2016] is addressing all types of conflict temporally, such that the plans generated are guaranteed to be free of
goal-goal, norm-norm and goal-norm conflicts. An overall comparison of the current work to other related work is
summarised in Table 1.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we develop an approach which enables an agent to reason about its practical attitudes (i.e., actions, goals,
norms) so as to identify the best course of actions to execute. Reasoning about what to do when the agent has multiple
goals is a challenging task, particularly when these goals conflict. Moreover, social agents are often subject to norms
imposed on them by the society of which they are members, or by other agents in the system. These norms aim to
regulate the agent’s behaviour in accordance with what is expected of them by others. However, these norms may not
be aligned with the agent’s goals, and can also be inconsistent. In such a complex environment the agent is not likely to
be able to satisfy all its goals while complying with all the norms imposed on it. What is required of a rational agent is
to be able to reason about what to do with respect to both its goals, and the norms imposed upon it, before committing
to any course of action.
Argumentation serves as an effective computational tool for automated reasoning [Amgoud 2003; Bench-Capon et al.
2009; Dung 1995; Gaertner and Toni 2007; Oren et al. 2007]. In this role, argumentation is particularly important because
it allows the reasoner to obtain consistent conclusions from conflicting, inconsistent and incomplete information. In
the current work, we use formal argumentation techniques to reason about an agent’s goals and norms, with the aim
of identifying the best course of action - in terms of the quality (i.e., preferences) and quantity (i.e., number) of goals
satisfied and norms violated - for the agent to follow.
7.1 Limitations
Several aspects of this work could be generalised further. Regarding norms, currently the activation condition of a
norm is an action and the deactivation is a deadline. Alternatively, as done in other approaches (e.g., [Oren et al. 2008]),
activation and deactivation of norms can occur when certain states are instantiated giving giving rise to state-based
norms as opposed to the action-based ones here. Other work (e.g., [De Vos et al. 2013]) allow both state-based and
action-based norms to co-exist. Given such state-based norms, additional propositions could be introduced, which hold
when a norm is violated, activated or deactivated [Oren et al. 2008]. In such a situation, the status of a norm could
then be used to trigger another norm, such as in the hierarchical normative framework described in [King et al. 2017],
where a first-order norm can trigger a second order norm etc., enabling the capture of notions such as a prohibition to
put certain obligations on actors in certain circumstances. We leave such extensions of our framework to future work.
In addition to allowing alternatives for expressing activation/deactivation conditions in norm representation, if the
framework proposed here is to be used in a multi-agent setting, the norm representation has to accommodate roles
[Vázquez-Salceda et al. 2005] so that the agents know which norms are imposed on them. Since we are dealing with a
single agent setting this is not an issue here.
Accommodating the above alternatives will have implications in terms of conflict detection and resolution, an
extensive survey for which can be found in [dos Santos et al. 2018]. We briefly mention these implications: (i) Allowing
state-based norms, from a technical viewpoint, is straightforward in our framework because it boils down to recognising
a certain state — as is for example the case when dealing with goal achievement — which is associated with norm
activation or deactivation. Detecting and resolving conflict, however, will then require defining mutually exclusive
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states (perhaps via additional meta-level propositions). Once mutually exclusive states are defined, obligations that
require the agent to achieve mutually exclusive states will be in direct conflict and so will be the obligations and
prohibitions that oblige and prohibit from achieving the same state of affairs simultaneously. (ii) Allowing norms to act
as activation/deactivation conditions of each other follows directly from the previous point, and can potentially be
dealt with using the same machinery. In hierarchical frameworks such as the one put forward by [King et al. 2017],
the assumption is that an higher order institution has power over a lower-order one, mimicking the roles of primary
(higher), secondary (lower) legislation, and regulation/business processes (lower still). However, this does not mean
higher level norms always override the lower level ones in the face of conflict; a lower level violation may uncover an
exception or dispensation that was overlooked in the drafting of the higher level. (iii) Allowing roles can potentially
give rise to direct and indirect conflicts that are caused by norms associated with roles that an agent plays [Cholvy
and Cuppens 1995; Günay and Yolum 2013]. For example it is possible that one role of the agent obliges it to do an
action, while a second role obliges the negation of the former action, in which case there will be a conflict between the
two. Conflict caused by the norms associated with a single role are considered as direct, while those caused by norms
associated with different roles are indirect.
We intend to address the mentioned types of conflict after accommodating the proposed generalisation to norm
representation. A separate type of conflict that is possible to investigate even within the current representation, is
the indirect one caused by side effects of plans. Termination of actions constantly changes the state the agent is in
as a plan unfolds. Since actions can be in progress in parallel, a state might be influenced by multiple actions ending
simultaneously. Thus, in addition to analysing the consequence of actions, consequence and side effects of plans can
be analysed when detecting indirect normative conflict. [Kollingbaum 2005] successfully deals with detecting and
resolving this type of conflict.
Another limitation is the assumption that the environment is deterministic (i.e.; the next state is predictable given
knowledge of the previous state and the agent’s action) and that actions are atomic and cannot be interrupted. In a
dynamic environment and in particular in a multi-agent setting, an agent’s actions may be interrupted and fail to
complete. Using agent programming languages such as [Bordini et al. 2007] can facilitate this.
The final discussion point is about achievement goals. Here we are considering achievement goals that need to be







has to be satisfied
at time 15. This could have been made more flexible if achievement goals meant to be satisfied at some point before
the deadline. Considering achievement goals that have to be satisfied before a certain point in time makes it very
difficult to pinpoint goal-goal and goal-norm conflict, as in these cases we must consider a time frame during which the
requirements of an achievement goal should hold. The fact that a goal was not satisfied at any time point before the
deadline can have many reasons that differ at different times (i.e., the reason why the goal was not satisfied at time x
might well be different from why it was not satisfied at time y). This ultimately makes it potentially impossible to find a
specific justification for why an achievement goal was not satisfied before its deadline.
7.2 Future Work
In addition to reasoning, argumentation can also serve as an effective computational tool for generating explanation
[Baroni and Giacomin 2009; Caminada et al. 2014a; Fan and Toni 2015; García et al. 2013; Lacave and Díez 2004; Shams
et al. 2016]. Agents equipped with argumentation capabilities can explain the validity of their inferences or reasoning to
humans, in the form of explanatory dialogues [Moulin et al. 2002]. These dialogues provide a dialectic proof mechanism
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for argumentation semantics [Dung 1995] through the exchange of utterances between parties. In the future, we intend
to give explanation for why a certain course of action is the best for an agent to follow, in particular focusing on
temporal properties of goals and norms and how different sequencing of actions can cause or resolve certain conflicts
with respect to time.
Another avenue that we envision for future work is to consider possible conflicts as well as the definite ones we
have covered in this paper. For instance, we have defined conflict between an obligation and a goal for the extreme
cases, where no scheduling of actions allows compliance with the obligation as well as satisfying the goal. However,
some schedules could exist which make the possibility of compliance with the obligation and satisfying the goal more
probable. These aspects can potentially be investigated within a Timed Argumentation Framework (TAF) [Budán et al.
2015] or Probabilistic Argumentation Framework [Li et al. 2011].
Appendix A VISUALISATION OF PLANS IN EXAMPLE 5.1
Visualisation of plans provided here, is in fact the visualisation of the answer set associated to that plan, that shows the
actions executed in each state as well as the states that execution of actions brings about. The boxes under each state
contain the fluents hold in that state. When a fluent holds for the first time, it appears in bold, but when it is carried
forward from a previous state, it is not bold anymore. If a fluent is terminated in a state it will be crossed out and will
not appear in the following state. To increase the readability norm fluents appear in a specific format, for instance,
norm fluent f (n1, buildShelter, 5) states that execution of action buildShelter is forbidden till state 5. cmp fluents encode
norm compliance and are highlighted in yellow, whereas violation fluents are encoded by vol and are highlighted in
red. Finally, sat fluents (highlighted by green) encode a goal is satisfied in a specific state, however in order for a goal to
be satisfied in a plan it has to be kept satisfied in all states that are included in the maintenance period.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 5. Visualisation of Plan 1, states 0 to 12















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 7. Visualisation of Plan 2, states 0 to 3


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 8. Visualisation of Plan 2, states 3 to 13

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 10. Visualisation of Plan 3, states 0 to 6































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 11. Visualisation of Plan 3, states 6 to 16





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 12. Visualisation of Plan 4, states 0 to 11






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 13. Visualisation of Plan 4, states 6 to 16
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Appendix B PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 4.11. Assume that ⊵G is a total preorder on P(G), while ≻д is not a total order on G. The
latter means that ∃д,д′ ∈ G s.t.(д,д′) <≻д and (д′,д) < ≻д . Since {д} and {д′} both belong to P(G) and (д,д′) <≻д
and (д′,д) <≻д , we conclude that ⊵G is not a total preorder which is contrary to assumption.
Assume that ≻д is a total order onG . In oder to prove that ⊵G is a total preorder, we need to prove that it is reflexive,
transitive, and total. It is easy to see it is reflexive and transitive (see Definition 4.9). Below we prove that it is total
meaning that ∀Gi ,G j ∈ P(G) either (Gi ,G j ) ∈ ⊵G or (G j ,Gi ) ∈ ⊵G . Let д = max((Gi ∪G j ) \ (Gi ∩G j )), wheremax
denotes the most preferred element of a set with respect with a certain preference ordering:
case 1: д ∈ Gi . Then ∀д′ ∈ G j ,∃д ∈ Gi s.t. (д,д′) ∈≻д , which means (Gi ,G j ) ∈ ⊵G .
case 2: д ∈ G j . Then ∀д′ ∈ Gi ,∃д ∈ G j s.t. (д,д′) ∈≻д , which means (G j ,Gi ) ∈ ⊵G .
□
Proof of Proposition 4.18. We need to show: ∀π ∈ Π, (π ,π ) < >π .
π cannot be justified and unjustified at the same time. Also, both >G and >N are irreflexive so (π ,π ) < >G , and
(π ,π ) < >N . Thus, (π ,π ) < >π . □
Proof of Proposition 4.19. We need to show: ∀π1,π2 ∈ Π, if π1 , π2 and (π1,π2) ∈ >π then (π2,π1) < >π .
Assume that π1 , π2 and (π1,π2) ∈ >π while (π2,π1) ∈ >π .
case 1: (π2,π1) ∈ >π because π2 is justified and π1 is not. This means that (π1,π2) < >π which is contrary to
assumption.
case 2: (π2,π1) ∈ >π because π2 and π1 are both justified and (π2,π1) ∈ >G . Since >G is antisymmetric (π1,π2) <
>G , which means that (π1,π2) < >π that is contrary to assumption.
case 3: (π2,π1) ∈ >π because π2 and π1 are both justified and (π2,π1) ∈ ∼G but (π2,π1) ∈ >N . Since ∼G is
symmetric, (π1,π2) ∈ ∼G and since >N is antisymmetric (π1,π2) < >N , which means that (π1,π2) < >π that is
contrary to assumption.
□
Proof of Proposition 4.20. We need to show: ∀π1,π2,π3 ∈ Π, if (π1,π2) ∈ >π and (π2,π3) ∈ >π , then (π1,π3) ∈
>π .
case 1: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 is justified but π2 is not. On the other hand, (π2,π3) ∈ >π because π2 is justified
but π3 is not. This cannot be the case since π2 cannot be both justified and unjustified.
case 2: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 is justified but π2 is not. On the other hand, (π2,π3) ∈ >π because π2 and π3 are
both justified but (π2,π3) ∈ >G . This cannot be the case since π2 cannot be both justified and unjustified.
case 3: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 is justified but π2 is not. On the other hand, (π2,π3) ∈ >π because π2 and π3 are
both justified and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼G , while (π2,π3) ∈ >N . This cannot be the case since π2 cannot be both justified
and unjustified.
case 4: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 and π2 are both justified but (π1,π2) ∈ >G . On the other hand, (π2,π3) ∈ >π
because π2 is justified but π3 is not. Since π1 is justified and π3 is not, (π1,π3) ∈ >π .
case 5: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 and π2 are both justified but (π1,π2) ∈ >G . On the other hand, (π2,π3) ∈ >π
because π2 and π3 are both justified but (π2,π3) ∈ >G . Since >G is transitive, from (π1,π2) ∈ >G and (π2,π3) ∈
>G we conclude that (π1,π3) ∈ >G . Thus, (π1,π3) ∈ >π .
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case 6: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 and π2 are both justified but (π1,π2) ∈ >G . On the other hand, (π2,π3) ∈ >π
because π2 and π3 are both justified and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼G , while (π2,π3) ∈ >N . Since >G and ∼G are both transitive,
from (π1,π2) ∈ >G and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼G we conclude that (π1,π3) ∈ >G . Thus, (π1,π3) ∈ >π .
case 7: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 and π2 are both justified and (π1,π2) ∈ ∼G but (π1,π2) ∈ >N . On the other hand,
(π2,π3) ∈ >π because π2 is justified but π3 is not. Since π1 is justified and π3 is not, (π1,π3) ∈ >π .
case 8: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 and π2 are both justified and (π1,π2) ∈ ∼G but (π1,π2) ∈ >N . On the other hand,
(π2,π3) ∈ >π because π2 and π3 are both justified but (π2,π3) ∈ >G . Since >G and ∼G are both transitive, from
(π1,π2) ∈ ∼G and (π2,π3) ∈ >G we conclude that (π1,π3) ∈ >G . Thus, (π1,π3) ∈ >π .
case 9: (π1,π2) ∈ >π because π1 and π2 are both justified and (π1,π2) ∈ ∼G but (π1,π2) ∈ >N . On the other
hand, (π2,π3) ∈ >π because π2 and π3 are both justified and and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼G and but (π2,π3) ∈ >N . Since
∼G is transitive, from (π1,π2) ∈ ∼G and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼G we conclude that (π1,π3) ∈ ∼G . Also since Since >N is
transitive, from (π1,π2) ∈ >N and (π2,π3) ∈ >N we conclude that (π1,π3) ∈ >N . Thus, (π1,π3) ∈ >π .
□
Proof of Proposition 4.21. We need to show that ∼π is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Reflexive: Assume that ∃π ∈ Π s.t. (π ,π ) < ∼π . If (π ,π ) < ∼π then (π ,π ) ∈ >π , which cannot be the case since
>π is not reflexive.
Symmetric: Assume that (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π but (π2,π1) < ∼π . If (π2,π1) < ∼π then either
case 1: (π1,π2) ∈ >π , which means that (π1,π2) < ∼π . This is contrary to assumption (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π . Therefore,
(π2,π1) ∈ ∼π .
case 2: (π2,π1) ∈ >π , which means that (π1,π2) < ∼π . This is contrary to assumption (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π . Therefore,
(π2,π1) ∈ ∼π .
Transitive: We need to show that if (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼π , then (π1,π3) ∈ ∼π .
case 1: (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π because they are both not justified. Also (π2,π3) ∈ ∼π because they are both not justified.
Therefore, neither of π1 and π3 are justified, so (π1,π3) ∈ ∼π .
case 2: (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π because they are both not justified. On the other hand, (π2,π3) ∈ ∼π because they are both
justified and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼G and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼N . But π2 cannot be both justified and unjustified.
case 3: (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π because they are both justified and (π1,π2) ∈ ∼G and (π1,π2) ∈ ∼N . On the other hand,
(π2,π3) ∈ ∼π because neither of them is justified. But π2 cannot be both justified and unjustified.
case 4: (π1,π2) ∈ ∼π because they are both justified and (π1,π2) ∈ ∼G and (π1,π2) ∈ ∼N . On the other hand,
(π2,π3) ∈ ∼π because they are both justified and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼G and (π2,π3) ∈ ∼N . Since ∼G and ∼N are both
transitive, it follows that π1 and π3 are both justified and (π1,π3) ∈ ∼G and (π1,π3) ∈ ∼N . Thus, (π1,π3) ∈ ∼π .
□
Proof of Proposition 4.23. ≥ is a total order on Π iff it is antisymmetric, transitive and total.
• antisymmetric: We need to prove that if ([πi ], [πj ]) ∈ ≥ and ([πj ], [πi ]) ∈ ≥ then [πi ] = [πj ]. If ([πi ], [πj ]) ∈ ≥
, then (πi ,πj ) ∈ >π or (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼π . If (πi ,πj ) ∈ >π , then (πj ,πi ) <>π . Because ([πj ], [πi ]) ∈ ≥, we have to
have (πj ,πi ) ∈ ∼π , which leads to [πj ] = [πi ].
• transitive: We need to show that if ([πi ], [πj ]) ∈ ≥ and ([πj ], [πi ]) ∈ ≥, then ([πi ], [πk ]) ∈ ≥. If ([πi ], [πj ]) ∈ ≥
then (πi ,πj ) ∈ >π or (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼π . Similarly, if ([πj ], [πk ]) ∈ ≥ then (πj ,πk ) ∈ >π or (πj ,πk ) ∈ ∼π . Since >π
are ∼π are both transitive, in either of the following four cases we conclude that ([πi ], [πk ]) ≥:
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case 1: (πi ,πj ) ∈ >π , and (πj ,πk ) ∈ >π implies (πi ,πk ) ∈ >π and therefore ([πi ], [πk )] ∈ ≥.
case 2: (πi ,πj ) ∈ >π , and (πj ,πk ) ∈ ∼π implies (πi ,πk ) ∈ >π and therefore ([πi ], [πk )] ∈ ≥.
case 3: (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼π , and (πj ,πk ) ∈ >π implies (πi ,πk ) ∈ >π and therefore ([πi ], [πk )] ∈ ≥.
case 4: (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼π , and (πj ,πk ) ∈ ∼π implies (πi ,πk ) ∈ ∼π and therefore ([πi ], [πk )] ∈ ≥.
• total: If ≥ is not total, then ∃[πi ], [πj ] s.t. ([πi ], [πj ]) < ≥ and ([πj ], [πi ]) < ≥. If ([πi ], [πj ]) < ≥, then (πi ,πj ) <
>π and (πi ,πj ) < ∼π . On the other hand, if ([πj ], [πi ]) < ≥, then (πj ,πi ) < >π and (πj ,πi ) < ∼π . From
(πi ,πj ) < >π and (πj ,πi ) < >π we conclude that (πi ,πj ) ∈ ∼π , which is contradictory to (πi ,πj ) < ∼π and
(πj ,πi ) < ∼π .
□
Proof of Property 1. Since all arguments are built on defeasible rules, the property follows immediately. □
Proof of Property 2. Suppose the conclusions of extensionE are inconsistent, i.e., there are argumentsArдα ,Arдβ ∈
E such that:
- Arдα ’s conclusion requires executing plan π and Arдβ ’s conclusion requires satisfying goal д/complying with norm n,
while д is not satisfied/n is violated in π . Thus, Arдβ defeats Arдα ; E is not conflict-free and cannot be an extension.
- Arдα ’s conclusion requires satisfying goal д/complying with norm n and Arдβ ’s conclusion requires satisfying goal
дfi/complying with norm n′, while д/n and д′/n′ are inconsistent. Thus, Arдα attacks Arдβ and vice versa. Due to
the preferences, at least one of these attacks is identified as defeat and therefore E is not conflict-free and not an
extension. □
Proof of Property 3. Follows immediately from lack of strict rules. □
Proof of Property 4. Every preferred labelling is a complete labelling. An argument is labelled in by a complete
labelling iff all its attackers are labelled out . Therefore, a plan argument is labelled in by a preferred labelling iff all its
attackers, namely the arguments for goals that it does not satisfy and norms that it violates, are labelled out by that
labelling. □
Proof of Property 5. Since Arдπ ∈ in(L), from Property 4 we know that⋃д∈G\Gπ Arдд ∪ ⋃n ∈Nvol (π ) Arдn ⊆
out(L). We also know from the definition of a plan that ⋃д∈Gπ Arдд ∪ ⋃n ∈Ncmp(π ) Arдn is conflict free. Since








n ∈Nvol (π ) Arдn and⋃
д∈G\Gπ Arдд ∪
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n ∈Ncmp(π ) Arдn ⊆ in(L). □
Proof of Property 6. From Property 4 and Property 5 we know that if Arдπ ∈ in(L) then ⋃д∈G\Gπ Arдд ∪⋃




n ∈Ncmp(π ) Arдn ⊆ in(L). Since every preferred labelling is a complete
labelling and the following property holds for complete labellings: if out(Lcmp1) = out(Lcmp2) then Lcmp1 = Lcmp2;
we conclude that there is no more than one preferred labelling in which Arдπ ∈ in(L). □
Proof of Property 7. In Property 4 we showed that if Arдπ ∈ in(L) then⋃д∈G\Gπ Arдд ∪ ⋃n∈Nvol (π ) Arдn ⊆
out(L) and ⋃д∈Gπ Arдд ∪ ⋃n∈Ncmp(π ) Arдn ⊆ in(L), which makes the undec(L) = ∅. A preferred labelling with
undec(L) = ∅ is a stable labelling. Therefore, L is a stable labelling. □
Proof of Property 8. Elements of set Pref (Arд) cannot be defeated, as the set is conflict-free and the remaining
arguments belong to Arд \ Pref (Arд). The latter cannot defeat elements of Pref (Arд), because this would imply
an attack from a less preferred argument to a more preferred one has resulted in a defeat, which is contrary to
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assumption. Assume that ∃Arдα ∈ Pref (Arд) such that Arдα < in(L). If ∄Arдβ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Arдα ,Arдβ ) ∈ Def then
Arдα should have been labelled in by L otherwise it is contrary to the assumption of maximality of preferred labellings.
If ∃Arдβ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Arдα ,Arдβ ) ∈ Def then ∃Arдγ ∈ in(L) s.t. (Arдγ ,Arдα ) ∈ Def , which is contradictory to the
fact that Arдα cannot be defeated. Therefore, all elements of Pref (Arд) are labelled in by in(L). □
Proof of Property 9. plan argument aside, E1 and E2 differ in one argument and that is Arдα ∈ E1 and Arдβ ∈ E2.
Arдα and Arдβ are either goal arguments or norm arguments. So we have the following cases:
(1) α , β ∈ G: Since Arдα and Arдβ are both goal arguments and (Arдα , Arдβ ) ∈ ≻, we conclude that plan π1
goal-dominates plan π2 and therefore, (π1,π2) ∈>π .
(2) α , β ∈ N : Since Arдα and Arдβ are both norm arguments, and (Arдα , Arдβ ) ∈ ≻, plan π1 norm-dominates plan
π2 and since none of them goal-dominates the other one (we know that because the set of goal arguments is the
same in E1 and E2), we therefore have: (π1,π2) ∈>π .
(3) α ∈ G and β ∈ N : Since Arдα is a goal argument and Arдβ is a norm argument, we conclude that plan π1
satisfies a goal in addition to the goals satisfied in plan π2, therefore, plan π1 goal-dominates plan π2 and we
have (π1,π2) ∈>π .
(4) α ∈ N and β ∈ G: Similar to previous case, here we conclude that plan π2 satisfies a goal in addition to the
goals satisfied in plan π1, therefore, plan π2 goal-dominates plan π1 and we have (π2,π1) ∈>π . The result is not
intuitive, since the extensions differ in one argument and the argument preference suggests that π1 should be
better than π2, however we have the opposite. The reason that this property does not hold in this case, is the fact
that when ranking plans (Definition 4.17) goal-dominance take precedence over norm-dominance and therefore,
the following preference (Arдα ,Arдβ ) ∈ ≻ is overridden.
□
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